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Abstract 
This article examines the relationship between globalization and national 
education reforms, especially those of educational systems. Instead of exploring 
the much debated issues of how globalization affects national educational systems 
and how the nations react by what kinds of systemic education reform, however, 
it focuses on what such a method often leaves out – the internal conditions of a 
nation that facilitates or hampers reform efforts. Taking South Korea as an 
example, it explores that country’s unique national context which restricts and 
even inhibits education reforms. Especially noted here is the established “statist” 
political economy in education. In the paper’s analysis, although South Korea’s 
statist political economy has made a substantial contribution to economic and 
educational development, it is now considered increasingly unviable as 
globalization progresses. Nevertheless, the internal conditions, resultant from the 
previous statist policies, set limits on policy makers’ efforts to alter the existing 
educational system. The analysis suggests that a fuller assessment of 
globalization’s impact upon national educational systems or their reforms 
requires a perspective which is broad enough to encompass not only the concepts 
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and/or theories of globalization and nation states but also the power relations and 
ideological setup of individual nations. 
  
 I begin by exploring the meaning of globalization and pointing out the need to 
consider individual nations’ internal conditions. Focusing on South Korea, then, I identify a 
statist political economy that is in place and the policy making venues it implicates. Then, the 
analysis moves on to identify the statist educational policies employed during the developmental 
years of military dictatorship and the structural educational problems resulted from such 
policies. This is followed by an examination of the educational reform agendas of liberalization 
and diversification that emerged at a time of globalization and civilian democracy, and of the way 
in which the country’s internal conditions obstructed reform efforts. I conclude by suggesting 
that, in spite of such negative functions, the internal conditions will eventually be altered as 
statism becomes increasingly unviable under the forces of globalization. 
 
 
Globalization and the Internal Conditions of Nations 
 
A salient theme of the globalization discourse concerns the emergence of transnational 
capital—financial and industrial capital which freely “roams around the world in search of 
profits and efficient production sites” (Fudge and Glasbeek 1997, 219). According to Cox (1993, 
259-60), globalization exhibits “two principal aspects.” One is the global organizations of 
production involving complex transnational networks of production, which take advantage of 
costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labor as well as political security and predictability. 
The other principal aspect is global finance, which involves a very large unregulated system of 
transactions in money, credit, and equities. These aspects of globalization are also, in his view, 
the principal aspects of the global economy which follows globalization and, in operation, 
transcends national boundaries, thus reducing the nation state’s autonomy and demanding that 
national economies be adjusted to its own exigencies (Ibid.; Ohmae 1993; Gummet 1996). 
Further, the integration of domestic economies into the global economy places the nation states 
under “insecurity” (Ratinoff 1995, 147) notably of revenues which generate financial resources 
for governing and protecting domestic activity. While state revenues depend on the nation’s 
economic performances, the latter now rely on the transnational behavior of the global economy. 
The nation state, it follows, has not only to conform to the global economy but also to reduce its 
domestic role to an affordable level. If so, then, public education, which has been expanding at 
the time of the state’s ever-increasing commitment, may no longer do so. Rather, it may have to 
go through a restructuring process involving such policies as liberalization, decentralization and 
privatization. 
 The globalization discourse also involves another theme, that globalization is related not only 
to transnational capital and the global economy but also to other factors, notably global “cultural 
forces” that affect national educational systems (Mazrui 1990; UNESCO 1998) and prompt 
transformations and transitions (Mebrahtu et al. 2000). Included in such forces, and noted 
among them, are information and communication technology (ICT) and the innovative 
processes it foments (Carnoy 1999; Nelson-Richards 2003). In this theme, a nation’s economic 
prosperity depends on its performance in the global economy, which, in turn, relies on the 
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workforce’s adjustment to, and leadership in, the knowledge-intensive mode of production 
buttressed by ICT. Of importance for this is to have “a workforce that has the foundation to 
enhance the quality and efficiency of product development, production and maintenance, and 
the flexibility to acquire the new skills required for new jobs” and “a cadre of highly-trained 
scientific, technical and processing personnel” (Haddad 1997, 37). The former requires solid 
primary and secondary education while the latter calls for quality higher education. These 
requirements can be met by increased state investment in education and a reinforced national 
educational system. In this theme, thus, the state has to enhance its role in education. 
 The two conflicting themes have generated different responses regarding the impact 
of globalization on national educational systems. One such response is found often in the works 
by those who are outside the field of education. It speaks of public education’s continuity at a 
time of crisis and points to the necessity of restructuring national educational systems in order to 
make them cost-effective, decentralized, market-friendly, and viable in the new environment 
(World Bank 1995; Burnett and Patrionos 1997; Popkewitz 2000; Daun 2002; Mok and Chan 
2002). The second response, which is prominent in the works of those within the education field, 
runs in the opposite direction. It defends state commitment to education for equity and justice 
and denounces the more or less harmful effects of globalization, for instance, on the educational 
systems of Third World countries (Pannu 1996) or in advanced industrial nations such as Canada 
(O’Sullivan 1999), on the worse-offs in public schools in comparison with the better-offs in 
private schools (Espinola 1992; Reynolds and Griffiths 2002), on neglected primary and 
secondary education in comparison with favored higher education (e.g., Samoff 1994), on 
tensions between global and local dynamics in culture and education (Burbules and Torres 2000; 
Stromquist and Monkman 2000; Torres 2002), on the need of resistance to globalization 
(McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001), and so on. To be fair, these responses are both empirical 
and moralistic, empirical because they draw upon facts collected from individual nations and 
moralistic because they are disposed to condone or condemn globalization. 
A third response is more moralistic than empirical. It denies both of the above-mentioned 
themes and demands that nation states increase their commitment to education because 
globalization elevates, and does not lower, their status, allegedly, as is evident in East Asian 
countries (Green 1997; Green 1999). Meanwhile, a fourth response, which is more empirical 
than moralistic, states that globalization has rendered “little effects” to national educational 
systems (McGinn 1997). 
 Such diverse responses, however, commonly leave out one area which is important for 
a fuller account of the relationship between globalization and national educational systems. This 
area is actually hinted at in the fourth cited response, in which decentralization confronts 
resistance from “conservative” teachers, parents and local actors who do not want changes to 
the status quo (Ibid.). Education reforms are initiated and pursued by those who recognize the 
necessity of change. More often than not, however, their policy agendas and ideas are not 
finalized as policies straightforwardly. In the policy making processes, such agendas and ideas 
confront opposing agendas and views, and are compromised, revised and even discarded to the 
good or bad. For this reason, what is observed in state education policies, school statistics, 
changes or no changes to national educational systems, shows the outcome of the negotiations 
and compromises which have taken place in a relatively short time span. It does not readily 
reveal the kind of impact of globalization that is now canceled out by opposing forces but will 
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resurrect later on when the opposing forces recede. 
Important to consider in this light is the internal conditions which play a crucial role in 
the policy making and implementation processes, especially the state’s established political 
economy which is institutionalized in state-society, state-education relationships. In their 
application to individual nations, globalization-triggered reform measures—such as 
liberalization, decentralization and privatization—confront the state’s established way of dealing 
with societal and educational matters. If the established way is one of relatively open and 
permissive of freedom of activity in society and education, such measures may be applied with 
relative ease. If not, however, it may not. The reason is that the reform measures are, in this case, 
more than mere reform measures: they aim to alter the established political economy itself. If a 
state’s established political economy is closed and not permissive of freedom in society and 
education, therefore, such measures are either unlikely to be employed or to be employed 
superficially as if nothing has happened in spite of globalization, or even as if the nation state has 
enhanced its status due to globalization as Green (1997; 1999) mistakes. 
 Here, it is interesting to examine how South Korea’s established political economy 
influences policy making and implementation in education. It is so because the country’s 
“statist” political economy has created internal conditions that are not susceptible to 
globalization but, rather, inhibits changes to existing state-society, state-education relationships. 
 
Statist Political Economy and Its Policy Making Process 
 
Statism as a Political Economy Concept 
 Statism is a concept of political economy which denotes a peculiar way in which the 
political state deals with the economic activity of individuals and groups in the civil sphere (or 
“civil society” or “society”).1 In the statist political economy, roughly, the state subjugates the 
interest of individuals or groups to its own interest or the interest of the nation (or society at 
large). However, statism in this rough sense is too broad to be useful as an analytic tool, for any 
intervention by the state in civil matters can be seen as the subjugation of individual or group 
interest to the state’s own interest. In fact, all modern states intervene in civil matters in one way 
or another, so all of them can be “statist” as the libertarians would claim. Statism in such a broad 
sense proffers no help to distinguishing a state’s way of dealing with civil matters from another 
state’s. To be a useful analytic tool, it needs circumscription against the concrete context of 
specific countries. 
 Statism, as it is found in South Korea is, generally, a legacy of Japan’s colonial rule, 
1910-1945, and Japan, in turn, imported it from Prussia. Therefore, statism in South Korea 
shares certain general features with those in Japan and, indirectly, in Prussia (and also with other 
East Asian countries which employ the “Japanese model of market economics” [Sakakibara 
1993], such as Taiwan and, arguably, China). An important common feature of this type of 
statism is that the state maintains big power, bureaucracy and institutional networks by which to 
control and manage the activity of civil society in order to make “the nation wealthy and its 
military strong” (fukoku kyohei; pugug kangbyong) as proclaimed in the past, or to promote 
“economic development” and “social well-being” as emphasized more recently. State 
intervention in society in South Korea and Japan is so extensive and intensive that its influence is 
felt at all tissues of social fabric, so much so that it is often questioned whether these countries 
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really have a “civil society” in the sense of a collectivity of self-seeking individuals (see McVeigh 
1998). In Prussia, as well, the individuality of a person was considered—for instance, in the 
works of Hegel—in reference to the totality of the state. 
 On the contemporary scene, however, statism in Japan and South Korea shows 
different features from what remains in Germany. While Germany’s political economy is often 
characterized by social partnership and corporatism, such characteristics are not visible in those 
two countries. Policy making and implementation in Japan is a process in which the state 
unilaterally decides for society according to its own agendas (Schoppa 1991). The state does not 
seek public consultation or consultation with the parties to be affected by the policies under 
consideration except through some nominal procedures. Policy negotiations and compromises 
occur within the governing circle, involving government leaders, the ruling political party and 
state bureaucrats, in the manner of “patterned pluralism” (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, 543). 
Particularly noteworthy here is the bureaucrats’ prominent status. According to Schoppa, the 
Liberal Democrats’ long one-party domination allowed the bureaucrats to accumulate power to 
the extent that, in the mid-1980s, they successfully thwarted government leaders’ efforts to 
liberalize the overly state-controlled educational system in order to better cope with 
globalization.2 
 The state’s unilateral process of policy making and imposition is conspicuous also in 
South Korea.3 But the roles of political parties and the bureaucrats in the process are not as 
powerful as they are in Japan. Whilst in Japan the long domination by the elected Liberal 
Democrats did not generate serious issues about the legitimacy of power, South Korea’s military 
dictatorship did so. General Pag Chong Hi’s government was installed after the 1961 coup and 
ended in 1979 upon his assassination. Then, Generals Chon Du Hoan and Ro Tae U usurped 
power through a multi-stage coup completed with the Kwangju massacre of 200 protestors, and 
took turn to rule the country until 1993. During the three decades, the military elite confronted 
repeated challenges to the legitimacy of their power. In response, they tightly controlled the 
population and employed the state bureaucracy as an instrument for this. And in order to secure 
the efficiency of this instrument, they meticulously prevented the bureaucrats from acquiring 
prerogatives in their respective fields.4 Although the military elite had political parties for the 
legislature, as well, such parties were not permitted to air independent voices. As a result, the 
state-society relationship established during the military years was characteristic in that the state 
tightly controlled—or at least tried to control—the population, and the bureaucrats and political 
parties remained subservient. 
 
Venues to Policy Making 
 A unique policy making process emerged from this state-society relationship. The 
military elite’s principal concern in handling the persistent legitimacy crisis was the maintenance 
and legitimation of their power. They addressed this concern through a few typical venues to 
policy making. The first and foremost venue was, of course, the control of civilian activity, the 
suppression of resistance by means of the state apparatus, and the justification of such policies 
by pointing to the constantly “imminent” North Korean invasion. This venue, however, 
promised only short-term benefits; in the long run, it was detrimental rather than beneficial 
because it invited further resistance. The long-term security of power had to be sought for 
through another venue: a “mobilization strategy” (Brown 1998) with which to draw the 
unsupportive population to their side and thus legitimate their power. For this strategy, Pag’s 
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military junta in 1961 put forward a project of legitimation by economic development (or 
developmental legitimation) and all successive military governments adhered to this project 
albeit with modifications. The gist of this project was the messages to the population that 
everyone would have a fair share of the fruits once development became reality, and that the 
military elite who offered such a great promise were far greater than the “corrupt and 
incompetent” civilian leaders. 
 This second policy making venue, however, contravened the first venue. The junta’s 
developmental legitimation project was one of planned economic development. The state 
configured the final outcome of development, set necessary developmental tasks for 
intermediary stages, and tried to meet such tasks by allocating resources and opportunities to 
strategic industries and economic actors in order thus to boost their performances. This 
approach alienated non-strategic industries and actors and entailed the latter’s discontent and the 
egalitarian outcry for equality, equal opportunity, social justice, and so on. The 1961 junta’s 
reaction, and the reactions of subsequent military regimes, took two routes. In one route, it 
suppressed the display of discontent and open discussions on the egalitarian issues; in the other, 
it employed “egalitarian policy measures” (Lee CJ 1980) for a temporary mollification of the 
discontent. Such policy measures, however, aimed mostly at short-term effects in limited areas 
and did not address the problem directly. Even so, however, such measures conflicted with, and 
hampered, the developmental legitimation project. For example, the military government 
forbade and suppressed labor activity in favor of the manufacturer’s capital accumulation but, at 
the same time, it enforced price control, especially of daily necessities, in order to ease the 
underpaid workers’ troubles, in effect, restricting capital accumulation. 
 The developmental legitimation project was impeded also by a third policy making 
venue. Although the project was useful for the mobilization strategy, it was by nature a call for 
support in reference to a remote, uncertain future. The present legitimacy crisis required 
immediately effective means. For this, the military elite took advantage of the traditional 
“personalist ethic,”5 in which transactions were made through personal connections rather than 
through open competition. In this ethic, the military governments allocated strategic resources 
and opportunities through personal connections bridged by common regions of origin, alumni 
relationships, military camaraderies, as well as the personal knots bonded by bribery. This venue 
led to a considerable success because powerful support groups indeed emerged in various 
sectors, for example, chaebol groups (or business conglomerates) in raising irregular “political 
funds” for the military elite, the residents of North Kyongsang Province (the home of the 
military rulers) in casting supportive votes on election days, and the alumni of the province’s 
prominent high schools in promoting pro-government sentiments among the population. The 
resources and opportunities paid to such loyal support groups involved the channeling of 
strategic resources—loans from state-controlled banks and state-guaranteed foreign loans—to 
the chaebol groups, the concentration of industrial centers in the favored region, the monopoly of 
governmental and military posts by the alumni of schools in the region, and so on. The efficiency 
of the strategic allocation of resources and opportunities thus became significantly 
compromised. 
  These were the major venues through which the military rulers unilaterally made and 
implemented policies for civil matters in the larger society. Education policies, like economic 
policies, were generated through the same venues and, as in the case of the economic policies, 
followed by a huge expansion in education as well as serious structural problems. 
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Statist Policies and Structural Educational Problems 
 
Statist Education Policies 
 The military elite’s concern about the security and legitimation of power was apparent 
in their policy to control educational institutions. The purpose of this policy was to prevent and 
suppress resistance to their power and to garner support. To this end, they sought to ensure that 
all educational institutions, public or private, as well as the teaching staff, operated as 
instruments to carry out their decisions. The measures taken for this included the legal 
stipulation of educational institutions as “public institutions” in the case of public schools, and 
as “public legal bodies” in the case of private schools, and all teachers as “public agents in the 
field of education.” With this legal arrangement, the military elite controlled major spheres of all 
educational institutions’ operation: institutional licenses, student quotas, student selection, the 
curriculum and textbooks, examinations and tests, employment and management of the 
teaching personnel, and even day-to-day operation. Especially notable was the policy of uniform 
instruction ensured by one common curriculum for all schools and the textbooks which were 
either written by the state or approved according to given specifications. Such textbooks 
supplied a “right” answer to each question or issue to be dealt with in classrooms. 
 The developmental legitimation project also bore upon education policies. When Pag’s 
junta developed this project in 1961, it did not consider education to be a strategically important 
field. The attainment of full participation in primary education in the late 1950s had already 
secured a sufficient number of educated workers for the low-tech industrialization in pursuit 
(Cho 1994, 101n). Since available resources fell too short for the developmental legitimation 
project (which was to be launched in eight years after the destructive Korean War, 1950-1953), it 
was undesirable that education drained too much of them. On this judgment, the junta decided, 
for the time being, to freeze educational finance at a lowest possible level and prevent potential 
pressures for increased state funding for education. The policy it thus adopted was reduction in 
the supply of student places at the levels of secondary and higher education. It froze school 
licenses, cut down on student quotas, and downsized the existing education programs of schools 
and universities in order to make them “small in size but good in quality” (Lee IY 1996). Such 
developmental education policies took immediate effects in the forms of intensified entrance 
competition (especially at lower secondary education), popular outcry against “the school’s high 
threshold,” and disputes over the fairness of student selection procedures.6 
 Here, the junta turned to the egalitarian policy venue. It introduced a state entrance 
examination for each level of schooling and instructed all educational institutions to admit 
students according to the scores from the state examination. The latter indeed assured of a sense 
of procedural fairness in student selection but, simultaneously, it made entrance competition a 
major educational problem. Since all students who wanted to advance to the next level of 
schooling had to write the once-a-year examination, this examination activated a nationwide 
competition for higher scores, and the latter invited inter-school competitions for more 
successful graduates in the state examination. The situation worsened so quickly that, by 1966, 
Pag’s (now) government had rescinded its original downsizing policy and allowed for a moderate 
rise in student quotas (Table 1) while tightly controlling tuition fees in order to allay parental 
discontent. These egalitarian measures, however, fell far short of addressing the growing 
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problem. In 1968, therefore, the government decided to drastically increase student quotas and 
school licenses at the level of lower secondary education, where entrance competition was 
fiercest, and began to allocate more funds to this level of schooling in order to increase the 
number of schools. Then, it switched the focus of quota and license control to the next level of 
schooling: upper secondary education. 
 
Table 1 
University Enrolments During the Early Pag Years 
              
       1961     1963   1965  1967   1969 
              
State universities   33,472   30,223  25,964  26,893   32,265 
Private universities   82,033   82,739  79,679  97,136 100,665 
Total   133,709 105,238     105,643 124,029 132,930 
              
Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171. 
 
 Through the remaining military years, state intervention in the supply and demand of 
student places alternated between, and often straddled, developmental and egalitarian policy 
venues. The former always led to the containment of educational expansion and, therefore, 
restrictions on student quotas and new school licenses, while the latter persistently escalated 
entrance competition. Here, the uniformity of instruction supplied a common ground for the 
examination competition. Moreover, the state’s concern about the state entrance examination as 
an efficient and fair devise for ranking aspirants of admission established a principle that its 
questions should be prepared exclusively from within the uniform textbooks. Entrance 
competition, thus, became a highly technical matter of who remembered more of what was 
written in the textbooks. The schools which got swept in the competition taught students to 
memorize textbooks and ranked and re-ranked them through repeated tests, thus turning them 
against each other and alienating underachievers. Entrance competition quickly expanded 
beyond the school gate to after-school cramming classes and home tutoring. When, thus, it 
engulfed the entire nation, the demand for more and higher education soared up, for the 
competitive atmosphere both inside and outside the school continually coerced students, even 
those with no serious interest in advanced learning, to partake in it and move toward higher 
levels in schooling.7 And when, as in 1968, the aggravating competition inflamed a social crisis, 
the state decided to drastically raise the supply of student places at the troubled level of schooling, 
thus switching entrance competition to the next level of schooling. 
 As a result of alternating or straddling such policy venues, secondary and higher 
education grew rapidly. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of schools increased 2.4 times in 
lower secondary education, 2.6 times in upper secondary education, and 4.2 times in higher 
education. Meanwhile, student enrolment grew more quickly: 4.8 times, 9.2 times, and 19.0 times 
respectively (data from Kim CC and Lee CJ 1994, 61). In 1990, thus, participation rate at those 
levels of schooling became respectively 99.8 percent, 95.7 percent, and 46.0 percent (data from 
MOE 1998). From the perspective of political economy, however, such a speedy expansion of 
education prepared serious structural problems. 
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Structural Problems 
 (1) Financial problems.  The most serious problem was related to the soaring numbers 
of schools and students, which directly challenged the policy makers who pursued to contain 
educational expansion in order to prevent pressure for additional financial responsibility. The 
ever-intensifying entrance competition and the rising demand for more and higher levels of 
education made it inevitable for them to permit educational expansion and, thus, prompt the 
pressures for increased state funding. As suggested by the above figures, the students enrolled in 
middle schools doubled during the thirty years while those in high schools and universities 
quadrupled and quintupled respectively. Since the schools’ revenues were restricted by the state’s 
tuition fee control and low education funding, the infrastructure of educational institutions 
deteriorated quickly (see Table 2). The state initially attempted to address this problem by 
inducing additional investment from the owners of private institutions (where the infrastructure 
was much worse) but in vain. The owners did not have the money and would not spend it for 
their schools even if they had it, for reasons that will be presented shortly. Here, the state chose 
to transfer the burden to the parents by gradually increasing tuition fees. But this policy could 
not persist indefinitely.8 From 1980 on, therefore, the military government began to increase its 
education budget until its size hit a peak in 1993 at 23.4 percent of the total state budget (MOE 
1997, 870).9 
 
Table 2  
The Deteriorating Educational Infrastructure during the Pag Years 
             
        1965    1970    1975    1980 
             
 Students    105,643          146,414           208,986         403,989 
 Students per professor                19.9                18.8         20.7       27.9 
    (State universities)       (13.7)             (13.3)               (16.2)    (24.6) 
    (Private universities)       (23.4)      (21.1)      (22.6)    (28.7) 
 Library items       N/A              33.2         30.7      23.0 
 Building space per student (m2)     15.2             14.3          12.3      11.5 
     (State universities)     (19.1)          (15.6)       (10.4)   (11.5) 
     (Private universities)     (14.0)          (13.9)       (13.0)   (11.4) 
             
Source: KEDI (1997b), pp. 171, 173, 175, and 184-5. 
 
Considering the large defense budget and the increasing demand for welfare programs,10 
it was fair to say that the military government, by 1993, had come to spend for education up to 
the limit of its available resources. By that year, however, parental financial burden also had 
reached a peak: 58.4 percent of the total operation cost of all schools and universities (Koh 1998, 
26),11 plus a sum of after-school cramming fees which well exceeded the total operation cost of 
all schools and universities (Kong and Paeg 1994). In other words, the parents paid directly out 
of their pocket at least 1.6 times of the money spent for operating the entire school system while 
the state, on its own, committed to educational financing as much as it could. 
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 (2) Dependence on entrance competition and low-cost educational programs.  Another serious 
problem was that more money had to be spent for education outside the formal educational 
institutions than inside, and this entirely at parental burden. The principal cause of this problem 
was of course the intense entrance competition which drove students to after-school cramming 
classes. Were there no intense entrance competition, the huge sums of cramming fees would be 
unnecessary. Logically, the problem was not hard to solve. Since the intense entrance 
competition was caused by the education policies of seeking uniformity of education and 
containing educational expansion, the problem would vanish if the state stopped such policies. 
Such a simple solution, nevertheless, was unavailable to the military rulers because their political 
interest required the maintenance of power by uniform instruction and its developmental 
legitimation project. While the former laid a common ground for the nationwide competition, 
the latter dictated the minimization of educational expenses by keeping student places in short 
supply. In this sense, it is fair to say that the security and legitimation of power necessitated the 
intense entrance competition. 
 More important to note, however, is that educational institutions became dependent 
on the intense entrance competition. While the state’s student quota and tuition fee control, 
together with curricular and textbook control, restricted the freedom and autonomy of 
education, entrance competition and the subsequently rising demand for education, on the other 
hand, guaranteed student supply and, thereby, tuition fee-generated revenues. Although such 
revenues were limited, they allowed the institutions to run education programs without or with 
insufficient state funding if only they did not spend more than absolutely necessary. The schools 
and universities thus settled in a low-cost mode of operation. The schools widely practiced rote 
learning and drill in the uniform textbooks and testing and ranking students in preparation for 
the state entrance examination, and this in classrooms equipped and staffed minimally. 
University instruction, on the other hand, was widely perceived to be superficial. This mode of 
operation provoked complaints neither from the schools, where every student was driven by 
entrance competition, nor from the universities, where all students had already had “enough 
study.” Moreover, this mode of operation became increasingly profitable as the cyclical entrance 
competition crises compelled the state to increase student quotas and tuition fees. The 
guaranteed supply of students, thus, deprived educational institutions of the incentives for 
improving, and ability to improve, educational quality through mutual competition for new 
students. 
 The entire system of education thus came to turn on the single hinge of entrance 
competition. And the state policies which provoked entrance competition gradually became part 
and parcel of the institutionalized network of a statist political economy—“a concrete set of 
institutionalized channels” (Evans 1992)—in which they sustained themselves despite, actually 
thanks to, repeated “education reforms.” 
 (3) Private and public education. A third structural problem concerned the incorporation of 
private education into the public system. Private education has been defended in North America 
in light of consumer choice. The typical argument for this was that where public education 
served the population as a whole, the consumers ought to have alternative venues in their pursuit 
of education. Also, North American advocates pointed out that private education allowed for 
the freedom of dissentient educational practices outside the public system. An important point 
in the political economy perspective, however, was that it helped public education by reducing 
the state’s financial and other burdens for education, for more students in private education 
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meant less in public education. Private education in this sense was a safety valve to the financial 
stress under which the state provided education. In South Korea, however, statist policies have 
obliterated private education while keeping private schools and universities under private 
ownership. The state’s uniform control of education deprived private schools and universities of 
autonomy and independence and turned those institutions to pseudo-public institutions, or 
“institutions of public education” (konggyoyuggigoan). Financially, this meant an additional burden 
on the state side, because the difference between the tuition fee-generated revenues and the 
reasonable cost of operation (including profits in one form or another) had to be paid out by the 
state given that the latter set limits on revenues. From the 1980s, therefore, the government 
began to fund private schools and, by 1993, it had come to defray 70.6 percent of the operation 
cost in lower secondary education and 42.5 percent in upper secondary education. Meanwhile, it 
paid public schools only 77.4 percent of the operation cost in lower secondary education and 
78.0 percent in upper secondary education (Koh 1998, 28). Apparently, here, the state brought 
private education into the public sphere at the expense of public education. 
 This caused another financial trouble. Since full participation was attained at both 
levels of secondary education, it would now be hard for the state to sidestep the pressure to 
equalize funding for private and public schools and, furthermore, to offer full funding to both 
types of school. The actual financial impact of this pressure was extraordinarily great, because, in 
1993, private schools accommodated 24.5 percent of all students in lower secondary education 
and between 58.4 percent and 66.3 percent of the students in upper secondary education (Ibid.). 
The potential pressure for increased state funding was much greater at the level of higher 
education. While 83 percent of the students in higher education were enrolled in private 
institutions, state grants for such institutions accounted for less than 2 percent of their operation 
cost. 
 (4) The personalist ethic.  The prevailing personalist ethic was also a problem in the 
educational system, for it wasted, through corruption, a large portion of financial resources 
allotted to public and private schools. Financial irregularities in private schools and universities 
were frequent despite, or because of, state supervision and control. Efficiency in the state’s 
management of school and university licenses was also impaired by the personalist ethic. When 
the state decided to raise student quotas and new school and university licenses, for instance, the 
benefit was often distributed via personal connections. As a result, some institutions received 
additional student quotas and approval of new programs even though they did not possess 
necessary infrastructures. As well, licenses were often issued to those who did not have 
resources necessary for opening a school or university and even to those with no experience in 
education.12 Thus, the personalist ethic contributed to the decline of quality while educational 
expansion was rapidly in progress. 
 By 1993, the structural problems had deteriorated to such a degree that many South 
Koreans considered their educational system to be in a major crisis. In that year, the military 
government was replaced by President Kim Yong Sam’s civilian government. Also in that year, 
globalization became a burning issue among the debaters on education reform as well as among 
policy makers. Naturally, the debaters and the policy makers both considered the structural 
problems of education in light of how to cope with the new environment created by 
globalization and civilian democracy. 
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Globalization and Inability to Reform 
 
Structural Problems and Responses to Globalization and Civilian Democracy 
 
 As summarized earlier, the themes brought up with respect to the relationship between 
globalization and national educational systems are two: (1) that the nation state now has to 
restructure the educational system to reduce its own role in education by employing such reform 
measures as liberalization, decentralization and privatization, and (2) that, nevertheless, it has to 
prepare a well-trained, flexible and versatile workforce by reinforcing primary and secondary 
education and, at the same time, secure a cadre of highly-trained professionals by improving 
quality in higher education. Generally, these themes were also addressed by South Korean 
debaters on the needs and directions of education reform at the time of restoring civil 
democracy and grappling with globalization (Kim and Jung 1994). In spite of the diversity of the 
views they advanced from different angles, the debaters shared a common opinion that the 
existing educational system needed a large-scale overhaul if it was to be viable in the new age. 
The frequently-employed grounds for this common opinion were roughly three: (1) that the 
existing educational system had evolved through the military years and, for this reason, stifled 
educational actors’ free initiatives; (2) that the rapid educational expansion had degraded 
educational quality at all levels of schooling; and (3) that the imminent opening of South Korea’s 
education market to the globalizing world would jeopardize the future of the educational 
institutions settling in the complacency of low-cost, low-quality mode of operation on 
guaranteed student supply. It was also pointed out that the entrance competition-dependent 
schools and universities did not supply adequate manpower to the business community which 
now had to compete with foreigners on their own home ground. This idea led to a 
widely-supported view that the overly state-controlled educational system had to be 
“democratized,” “liberalized,” and “decentralized” (Ibid.). The objectives of this envisioned 
education reform were clearly to diversify educational activities and, thereby, cope with the 
growing pressure for increased state funding, to eliminate entrance competition based on the 
uniformity of the curriculum and textbooks, to revitalize private education, and to have a system 
of education that was to be operated rationally, not along personalist connections. 
 The first civilian President Kim Yong Sam, 1993-1998, incorporated this view into his 
political platforms. During his 1992 election campaign, he promised to employ “epoch-making 
and revolutionary” measures to liberalize and decentralize the educational system, to solve the 
entrance competition question, and to upgrade educational facilities and performances to the 
global standards (segehoa). Then, in 1994, he appointed reform-minded educationalists to a 
Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) with a mandate to develop policies for 
the promised education reform. 
The environment was even more favorable to this type of education reform in 1998 
when the next President Kim Dae Jung took over in the wake of the November 1997 financial 
meltdown. (His government remained in charge until 2003.) The immediate cause of that crisis 
was the sudden pullout of transnational funds, which shook hard the state-controlled financial 
institutions and, subsequently, the chaebol groups which relied on favorable loans from those 
financial institutions. The crisis aroused an even stronger public opinion for economic and 
educational reforms aiming to terminate the statist political economy which, by excessive state 
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control, obstructed development of a free market economy and deprived the economic actors of 
market competitiveness. Kim Dae Jung, therefore, promised a thorough education reform, of 
which goals remained the same: liberalization, decentralization, segehoa, and the termination of 
entrance competition. 
 
Negative Internal Conditions 
 In spite of such a favorable environment, however, the reform measures which the 
civilian governments employed did not bring significant changes to the existing educational 
system. The most important reason for this was their obvious underestimation of the magnitude 
of promised reforms. Liberalization meant that excessive state control of education would be 
withdrawn and the educational actors—schools and universities, teachers and professors, and 
students and their parents—would be allowed to operate freely and responsibly. 
Decentralization implied the transfer of power from the central authority to local residents. 
Finally, the termination of entrance competition meant the abolition of established state policies 
to control the curriculum and textbooks, student selection, tuition fees and student quotas, and 
the state entrance examination. Employing such measures meant a Copernican turn from a 
statist political economy to a political economy based on the educational actors’ free and 
responsible initiatives. The internal conditions did not permit such drastic measures, however. 
 First and foremost to note, the governments of the civilian leaders were not literally 
“civilian” by the nature of their power basis. The military elite’s effort to build supportive groups 
and regions along the traditional personalist ethic had tremendous impact upon South Korean 
voters. By the time the military elite relinquished their rule, South Koreans were divided into 
antagonistic groups and regions on the basis of what they called sarcastically “group egoism” 
(chibdan igijuyi) and “regional egoism” (chiyog igijuyi), so much so that neither of the two civilian 
leaders was able to garner a nationwide support. They both managed to gain power by coalition 
with the influential military factions, each with its own group and regional support bases. Kim 
Yong Sam, the politician from the South Kyongsang Province received endorsement from the 
voters in his province and the urban middle class. He grasped power by allying with Ro Tae Wu 
of the second-generation military group supported by the North Kyongsang Province and Kim 
Chong Pil of the first-generation military group supported by Chungchong Provinces. When 
Kim Chong Pil broke with Kim Yong Sam, Kim Dae Jung, who was supported by Cholla 
Provinces and the urban lower classes, worked out with him a “power-sharing” agreement 
(kongdongjongguon). The heterogeneous constituencies within the power groups, and the 
complicated regional and group affiliations, practically forbade reforms which were injurious to 
the interests vested in the status quo. 
 The civilian leaders’ weak power bases, on their own, had restrictive effects on 
available policy options. Although their power was obtained through fair electoral processes and 
did not generate disputes about legitimacy, their failure to draw nationwide support made it 
inevitable for them to continue with the developmental mobilization strategy, egalitarian policy 
measures,13 and oppressive measures where necessary. 
 There was another stumbling block. The years of state policies to control and manage 
education had left a huge body of bureaucrats. The ending of military rule released the 
bureaucrats from the tight grips of governmental leaders. Moreover, the civilian leaders’ lack of 
experience in running the state apparatus gave rise to the bureaucrats’ importance in policy 
making and implementation. The bureaucrats took advantage of all this in their effort to 
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maintain their own interest vested in big offices with ample resources and power. They 
obstructed the employment of such reform ideas as liberalization and decentralization by 
exhibiting reluctance to cooperate (pokjibudong, “lying with face down and making no 
movement”) and, at opportune times, by manipulating the policy making processes in order to 
filter reform ideas to policies suitable for their own interest by maintaining or further enhancing 
state control and management. The bureaucrats thus began to intercept in the state-education 
relationship to the effect of holding educational policy making and implementation within the 
existing statist political economy. And such efforts easily found endorsement from the 
educational institutions and their teaching staff equally dependent on the guaranteed supply of 
students under the entrance competition-hinged educational system.14 
 Gradually, thus, such internal conditions shifted the themes of education reform 
debate from liberalization, decentralization, and so on, to a reform that would enhance 
educational performances—in particular, “quality, excellence and the nation’s 
competitiveness”— within the existing arrangement but with enhanced state intervention and 
financial commitment (Kim and Jung 1994; Kim KS 1997). After all, it was now argued, 
education was “public by nature” (kyoyug-yi konggongsong) and the state’s extensive and intensive 
intervention in education was a prerequisite for the integrity of the educational system. The 
influence of such negative internal conditions becomes clear upon examining the two civilian 
governments’ policies on entrance competition. 
 
Entrance Competition Policies 
 (1) Maintaining Entrance Competition.  When appointed in 1994, PCER members 
understood liberalization, decentralization and the revival of free educational initiatives as 
necessary reform measures to solve the entrance competition question and rearranging the 
educational system for the new era of globalization.15 They generally perceived that the entrance 
competition question originated from the military governments’ extensive and intensive control 
of education and unsuccessful efforts to manage the supply and demand of student places. 
Therefore, in their view, the question would easily banish in the civilian era if educational 
activities were diversified by means of liberalization, and so on. But the “New Educational 
System,” which the PCER laid down in its official report after a year of work with Ministry of 
Education bureaucrats and other interested parties, demonstrated substantial modifications to 
those members’ original views (PCER 1995). 
 Basically, the PCER Report maintained that the new age into which South Korea was 
entering was going to be one of “a great turning point in the history of civilization,” in which the 
industry-guided world would become one dominated by information and new knowledge. From 
this outlook, it observed that an education reform that was in pursuit had to aim to endorse the 
nation’s economic prosperity in the new age by rectifying the structural problems of the existing 
educational system. As such structural problems, it pointed to entrance competition and such 
related problems as: 
· rote learning and drill in fragmentary knowledge which wiped out creativity and diversity 
from classroom;  superficial instruction in schools and universities; 
· heavy parental financial burden for after-school cramming classes (the cost of which in 1994, 
according to the Report, accounted for 5.8 percent of the gross national product in 
comparison with the state’s education budget which remained at 3.8 percent), 
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· the state’s uniform control of education which restricted the educators’ professional 
autonomy, and 
· disappearance of moral character from the students (referring to the selfishness of students 
engaged in entrance competition). (Ibid., 11-4) 
 
The Report thus brought up some key structural problems in relation to the entrance 
competition question. However, its approach to solving the problems did not differ from that of 
the previous military era. It stated that entrance competition was caused by the simple fact that 
student places were in short supply as evident in “the bottleneck phenomenon at university 
gates” (Ibid., 13). As the cause was simple, so was the solution: widen the narrow university gates 
by increasing student quotas and new university licenses until supply met demand. Once supply 
met demand, the PCER Report predicted, entrance competition and after-school cramming 
practice would disappear altogether and schools would return to their “normal” operation (Ibid., 
101-7). This was exactly what the policy makers of military regimes had been saying whenever 
they decided to increase the supply of student places at times of crisis. 
 It is here to be noted that the PCER’s policy making, as reflected in its Report, 
followed the venues established by the military elite—egalitarian and developmental. In the 
egalitarian venue, it recommended the increase of student quotas, new university licenses, and 
increased state funding of education. In the developmental venue, however, it sought to 
maintain the system of state-imposed student quotas, to contain new school licenses, to keep 
uniformity of the curriculum and textbook and the institution of annual state entrance 
examination. It only sought to “mend” the institution for improved efficiency through a 
newly-created National Institute of Educational Evaluation (KIEE). Given that such policies 
would not stop entrance competition, the PCER now turned to the egalitarian venue and 
recommended to suppress private cramming by resorting to the 1980 law of the Chon military 
junta, and to offer free state cramming services via a satellite television network (which was to be 
established exclusively for that purpose) in order thus to alleviate parental financial burden. In 
either of the two venues, the institutions of state control of education became reinforced by new 
institutions and increased funds in the hands of bureaucrats. 
 The effects of implementing PCER recommendations were what had actually 
happened repetitively during the military years: persistent entrance competition, further 
expansion of education, and further enhanced pressure for increased state funding for 
education. By 1998, thus, the total of student quotas in higher educational institutions had grown 
to the capacity of accommodating 94 percent of the year’s high school graduates. The 
institutions of higher education, however, managed to attract only 84 percent of them (Kim KS 
1999). 
 (4) Extending Entrance Competition to Graduate Schools. The surplus of student places 
created new problems for policy makers to deal with. Since the high participation rate in higher 
education was due to the drive toward universities and colleges triggered by intense entrance 
competition, the students who managed to enter one such institution included many who could 
not remain there due to financial reasons.16 The student places vacated by such students were 
filled with those transferred from other universities. Here, most students in less popular 
universities continued to look for opportunity to move to a more popular university. Thus, the 
over-supply of student places inflamed an unprecedented crisis for the universities which had 
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been relying on the student supply guaranteed by entrance competition. In reaction, the PCER 
in 1997 devised a policy agenda for “research-focused, graduate school-centered universities” 
(yongu-jungjom taehaguon-jungshim taehag) (PCER 1995, 23). 
 The underlying ideas of this program were three-fold. The first was that since 
large-scale increases in student quotas and new licenses did not bring entrance competition to a 
halt due to the popular preference of the top universities in the hierarchy, the PCER felt it 
necessary to close those top universities’ undergraduate programs or to reduce their student 
quotas to a degree of “near closure.” Instead, second, it felt that those universities should be 
transformed to “research-focused, graduate school-centered universities” while other 
universities were guided to concentrate their effort on teaching undergraduate students. Finally, 
the state should provide the research-focused, graduate school-centered universities with 
massive funding in order to transform them to very attractive (“world-class”) research 
universities. In the PCER’s developmental perspective, this would ensure the supply of 
high-quality research personnel for the country’s competitive performance in the global 
economy. In its egalitarian perspective, it would “extend” entrance competition to graduate 
programs and thus sustain the supply of students for the troubled undergraduate programs of 
middle- to low-ranking universities. 
 The subsequent Kim Dae Jung government has taken over this program and 
implemented it with a new name, “Brain Korea 21" (or “BK21”). In doing so, it also followed 
the military elite’s footsteps on the road to mass education at the level of graduate studies. 
 
The Viability of the Statist Educational System 
 
 The foregoing analysis shows the difficulties of changing a national educational system 
that has been established during the decades of statist political economy.17 The policy makers of 
the civilian governments understood that their nation’s prosperity in an era of globalization 
depended on having a viable educational system and, for this, it was essential to liberalize and 
decentralize the existing educational system. The process of policy making, however, guided 
them to policy measures which maintained the existing educational system and left its structural 
problems unaddressed. 
 What remains to be examined, then, is how the unresolved structural problems would 
bear upon South Korea’s economic future. South Korea cannot go ahead with the current 
educational system if it desires educational endorsement of continual economic prosperity. 
Note, in the first place, that participation in higher education is now almost full and, in addition, 
the policy to extend entrance competition to graduate schools will stimulate demand for 
education in those institutions. Full participation in higher education suggests either of two 
possible scenarios: that the nation’s workforce will soon consist entirely of university- or junior 
colleges-trained professionals, or that many higher educational institutions will actually be 
producing non- or semi-professional workers instead of professional workers. The former 
means serious manpower shortage in the industries demanding non-professional workers;18 the 
latter, on the other hand, implies the waste of precious financial resources. There is one more 
problem. If the observation is correct that ICT triggers perpetual innovation in the workplace, 
then the vitality of the workforce will rest on the periodic reeducation and retraining of workers 
by the institutions which deal with new knowledge and technology: universities and colleges. 
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However, the method of selecting students by ranking applicants in terms of how much they 
know about what high schools now teach will prevent most currently-employed workers from 
reeducation and retraining at the level of higher education. Therefore, those workers will be 
quickly invalidated by the perpetual innovation. 
 Financial problems are an even more serious concern. In 1997, according to OECD 
(2000, 32), the total expenditure of South Korea’s educational institutions, including state funds 
and parental expenses (yet excluding after-school cramming fees), was the highest of all OECD 
nations in terms of its proportion in the gross domestic product (GDP): 7.4 percent. In 2000, 
according to Bank of Korea estimation, the state’s education budget alone accounted for 5.7 
percent of the GDP (KEDI 1997a, 59). Even so, however, educational institutions remain very 
much under funded. Compulsory education is still limited to six years in primary schools except 
in some rural areas where it also covers additional three years in middle schools. Compulsory 
education of such a short time span, none the less, is not free. 3 percent of public primary 
schools’ operation cost (in governmental statistics and no less than 10 percent in reality) is 
collected from parents. Moreover, in urban centers, as many as 1,000 public school classes 
operate on a two-shift basis. Meanwhile, state grants to private institutions of higher education 
still covers less than 3 percent of their operation cost. Higher education being practically 
universal, and graduate programs attracting more and more students, the pressure for the state’s 
increased financial commitment will become much higher from now on than ever before. 
Parental financial burden, meanwhile, has already gone well beyond a tolerable level. 
 These problems alone, aside from other equally serious problems, would be sufficient 
to warrant a prediction that when globalization progresses further, the current educational 
system will not be viable in terms of ensuring the continuity of public education and of 
producing a flexible and versatile workforce and a cadre of highly-trained professionals. Only 
one solution seems workable: a big surgery on the statist educational system by means of a 
substantial degree of liberalization, decentralization, and the emancipation of private education 
as the PCER members originally contemplated. South Korea, however, cannot go for the 
solution because of the entrenched statist political economy of education—for the time being, at 
least. 
 
Notes 
1. Depending on the discursive context, it may also refer to a political concept or “a functional 
logic of political membership” (Kvistad 1999). Political economy is the way in which the political 
state deals with the economic sphere of civil society. In his Laws of Ecclesiastical Society (1593), 
which is perhaps the earliest English document to distinguish the political state from civil 
society, Richard Hooker wrote, “The state is not identified with civil society . . . Civil society is 
the organization of production in society; the state is not the organization of that production, it 
is the product of the relation between political economy and society” (cited in Krader 1976, 21). 
 
2. On his reading of Schoppa’s work, Green (1997, 24) observes that “Anglophone countries’ 
neo-liberal dogmas of free market economy [which prevail the global economy and liberalization 
of education] run against the bedrock opposition in [East Asian] countries which have strong 
traditions of state regulation, social partnership and corporatist planning.” He mistakes Japan to 
be Germany and “patterned pluralism” to be social partnership. Schoppa says that in Japan not 
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only interest groups such as the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) but also political parties with 
representation in the Diet are left out of policy making processes. 
 
3.  This may suggest that statism in East Asia is a modern version of the old mode of government 
dubbed “Asiatic despotism” rather than an imported political economy. Whether this name is 
fair or not, the state’s overwhelming status in relation to society is still apparent. In the Chinese, 
Japanese and Korean languages, “the state” (kuojia, kokka and kugga, “the king’s family”) can 
substitute “the nation” (kuomin, kokumin and kugmin, “the king’s subjects”), but not the other way 
round. In the contemporary use, the word for “the nation” is equated with “the members of a 
nation” or “the citizens” but not vice versa. The members of a nation and the citizens both 
remain subject to and cared for by the state, which is the same as the nation. Whether or not the 
speakers of those languages are aware, their discourse on the state-society relationship must be 
affected by the semantic linkages of the words. 
 
4.  A good example of this is the system of frequently rotating bureaucrats from one office to 
another. This rotation system was initiated by the military elite who feared the bureaucrats’ 
independence. But Amsden (1989) observes that South Korea’s economic development under 
the military regimes was due to the bureaucrats’ enlightened leadership. Her observation is 
apparently shortsighted. 
 
5.  For the “personalist ethic,” see Dore (1982) and Chang (1991). For a critical response, see 
Kim KS (1999). 
 
6.  Seth (1997) observes that developmental policies were not thoroughly enforceable because of 
the demand from the social forces of “teachers, school officials, private foundations, and 
especially parents” for equitable distribution of educational opportunity in secondary and higher 
education. 
 
7.  For analysis of the relationship between state intervention, entrance competition and the 
rising demand for education, see Kim KS (1999) and Koh (1998, 33-63). 
 
8.  Parental educational expenditure rose from 64,350 million won in 1966 to 251,288 million 
won in 1970 and to 458,305 million won in 1975 (Kim YB 1980, 263). 
 
9.  The state’s education budget fluctuated between 14.4 and 18 percent in its total budget during 
the Pag years (1961-1979), and between 18.6 and 22.8 percent during the Chon-Ro years 
(1980-1992) (Ibid., 821). Although the economy grew fast, educational expansion made the cost 
of education grow much faster. From 1970 to 1998, the GDP grew 164 times while the cost of 
education, including governmental and parental portions, rose 221 times. “Kyoyugbi nyongan 
chichul 25-jowon, GDP-yi 5.7 posentu,” Dongailbo, 14 February 2000. 
 
10. The defense budget was similar in size to the education budget. Due to the growing pressure, 
the Chon government introduced Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, Medical Insurance, and 
National Pension Insurance. For these programs, in 1987, the state spent merely 2.19 percent of 
the GDP. See Lee HK (1999, 29). 
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11. In 1997, a new student in Seoul paid $1,073 in Canadian currency in both public and private 
middle schools, $1,882 in both public and private high schools, $7,202 in a state university’s 
science faculty, and $11,482 in a private university’s science faculty (MOE 1997, 870). 
 
12. In 2000, for instance, 24 university licenses and 15 junior college licenses did not materialize 
as operating institutions. “Pobinman mandullgo mun an yon taehag 39 kot,” Chosunilbo, 3 
October 2000. 
 
13. During President Kim Yong Sam’s term, for instance, the state’s welfare expenditures grew 
from 3.5 percent of the GDP in 1992 to 4.47 percent in 1996 (Lee HK 1999, 34). 
 
14. Most schools and universities opposed changes to the existing educational system. Vocal in 
the opposition was teachers and professors. When abolishing the state entrance examination 
became an issue in 1998, for instance, a professor of education at a private university in Seoul 
wrote, “Should the state abolish the examination, it would have to tell universities how to select 
students.” Reference is withheld to protect identity. 
 
15. I interviewed three key members of the PCER in 1994 when they were exploring a general 
direction of education reform. 
 
16. The number of such students at state universities was 102,937 in 1998. This figure accounts 
for a third of those universities’ student quotas. “Hyuhagsaeng chungga kyoyugjaejong abbag,” 
Hankyoreh, 17 October 2000. 
17. After examining the economic reforms seeking “liberalization” and “deregulation,” J.A. 
Matthews (1998, 757) concludes, “South Koreans have no intention of replacing their former 
highly interventionist model of development with an Anglo-American style non-interventionist 
economy based on unfettered market forces.” 
18. While participation rate in higher education grew rapidly, manpower supply to the industry 
decreased quickly. In 1980, participation rate in higher education was 16.2 percent and the 
manufacturing sector felt 3.46 percent short of necessary manpower. In 1990, the participation 
rate reached 48.8 percent and the manufacturing sector’s manpower shortage surged to 6.85 
percent (Kang 1996). 
 
 
 
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea                                                                                  20 
 
References 
 
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (London: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Brown, D. (1998). “Globalization, Ethnicity and the Nation State,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 52:1, 35-46. 
 
Burbules, N.C., and Torres, C.A. (eds.) (2000). Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (New 
York: Falmer). 
 
Burnett, N., and Patrionos, H.A. (1997). “Education and the Changing World Economy: The 
Imperative of Reform,” Prospects 27:2 (1997), 223-30. 
 
Carnoy, M. (1999). Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know (Paris: 
UNESCO). 
 
Chang, Y.S. (1991). “The Personalist Ethic and the Market of Korea,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and Culture 33:1, 106-29. 
 
Cho, S. (1994). The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics). 
 
Cox, R. (1993). “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” In: 
Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, ed. S. Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 259-60. 
 
Daun, H. (ed.) (2002). Educational Restructuring in the Context of Globalization and National Policy (New 
York: Falmer, 2002). 
 
Dore, R.P. (1982). “Groups and Individuals.,” In: Society in Transition with Special Reference to Korea, 
ed. Y. S. Chang et al. (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1982), 13-29. 
 
Espinola, V. (1992). Decentralization of the Education System and the Introduction of Market Rules in the 
Regulation of Schooling: the Case of Chile (Santiago: CIDE). 
 
Evans, P.B. (1992). "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and 
Structural Change." In: The Politics of Economic Change, ed. S. Haggard and R. Kaufman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 139-81. 
 
Fudge, J., and Glasbeek, H. (1997). “A Challenge to the Inevitability of Globalization: The Logic 
of Repositioning the State as Terrain of Contest.” In: Global Justice, Global Democracy, ed. 
J. DryDyk and P. Penz (Winnipeg: Society for Socialist Studies). 
 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 13 No. 12                                                                                21 
 
21 
 
Green, A. (1997). Education, Globalization and the Nation State (Houndmills: Macmillan). 
 
Green, A. (1999). “Education and Globalization in Europe and East Asia: Convergent and 
Divergent Trends,” Journal of Education Policy 14:1, 55-71. 
 
Gummet, P. (1996). “Introduction.” In: Globalization and Public Policy, ed. P. Gummet 
(Cheltenham: Edward Edgar, 1996), 1-17. 
 
Haddad, W.D. (1997). “Globalization of the Economy: The Implications for Education and Skill 
Formation,” Prospects 27:1, 35-40. 
 
Kang, K.S. (1996). “The Impact of Shifts in Supply of College Graduates,” Economics of Education 
Review 15:1, 1-9. 
 
Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) (1997a). Hangug-yi kyoyugjipyo 1997 (Seoul: 
KEDI). 
 
Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) (1997b). Tonggero bon hangug kyoyug-yi paljachui 
(Seoul: KEDI). 
 
Kim, C.C., and Lee, C.J. (1994). Kyoyughaengjong-yi riron-goa shilje (Seoul: Kyoyuggoahagsa). 
 
Kim, E.G. (2002). “Educational Decentralization in Korea: Major Issues and Controversies.” 
Paper presented at the Comparative International Education Society Annual 
Conference, Orlando, FL, March 6-9, 2002. 
 
Kim, K.S. (1997). Ajig koaoe-rul kumanduji mara (Seoul: Minumsa). 
 
Kim, K.S. (1999). A Statist Political Economy and High Demand for Education in South Korea, 
Educational Policy Analysis Archives, 7(19). Retrieved February 5, 2005 from  
http://epaa.asu.edu/v7n19.html. 
 
Kim, K.S., and Jung, J.G. (1994). Kyoyugkaehyogronyi-yi choragjog yogsajog tojabgi (Seoul: Korean 
Educational Development Institute). 
 
Kim, Y.B. (1980). “Education and Economic Growth,” in Human Resources and Social Development in 
Korea, ed. C. K Park (Seoul: Korea Development Institute). 
 
Koh, H.Y, et al. (1998). 2002-nyondo ihu-yi ibhagjedo kaeson-e koanhan yongu. Policy study report for 
the Ministry of Education. 
 
Kong, U.B., and Paeg, S.J. (1994). Hangug kyoyugtuja-yi shiltae-oa suigryul punsog-e koanhan yongu 
(Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute). 
 
 
 
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea                                                                                  22 
Krader, L. (1976). Dialectic of Civil Society (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Assen). 
 
Kvistad, G. (1999). The Rise and Demise of German Statism (Providence: Berghahn Books). 
 
Lee, C.J. (1980). Hangug kyoyug-yi chongchigyongjehag sosol (Seoul: KEDI). 
 
Lee, H.K. (1999). “Globalization and the Emerging Welfare State,” International Social Welfare 8:1, 
29-43. 
 
Lee, I.Y. (1996). “Taehagibhagjedoy-yi kaehyog-e taehan pyonggayongu,” Hangug gyoyugmunje 
yonguso ronmunjib 11, 133-47. 
 
Matthews, J.A. (1998). “Fashioning a New Korean Model out of the Crisis,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 22, 747-759. 
 
Mazrui, A.A. (1990). Cultural Forces in World Politics (London: James Currie). 
 
McGinn, N.F. (1997). “The Impact of Globalization on National Educational Systems,” Prospects 
27:1, 41-54. 
 
McLaren, P., and Farahmandpur, R. (2001). “Teaching Against Globalization and the New 
Imperialism: Toward a Revolutionary Pedagogy,” Journal of Teacher Education 52:2, 
136-50. 
 
McVeigh, B.J. (1998). The Nature of the Japanese State: Rationality and Rituality (London: Routledge). 
 
Mebrahtu, T., at al. (2000). Globalisation, Educational Transformation, and Societies in Transition 
(London: Symposium Books). 
 
Ministry of Education (MOE) (1997). Statistical Yearbook of Education 1997 (Seoul: Ministry of 
Education). 
 
Ministry of Education (MOE) (1998). “1998-nyondo chyuyo ommu pogo.” Annual Report 
submitted to the President. 
 
Mok, J.K., and Chan, D.K. (2002). Globalization and Education: The Quest for Quality Education in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press). 
 
Muramatsu, M., and Krauss, E. (1987). “The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of 
Patterned Pluralism.” In: The Domestic Transformation, ed. K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
 
Nelson-Richards, M. (2003). “Globalization’s Influence on Transformation and Reform of 
Education: Examples from EU and SEA.” Paper presented at Hawaii International 
Connference on Social Sciences, Honolulu, June 12-15. 
 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 13 No. 12                                                                                23 
 
23 
 
O’Sullivan, B. (1999). “Global Change and Educational Reform in Ontario and Canada,” 
Canadian Journal of Education 24:3, 311-25. 
 
OECD (2000). OECD kyoyugjipyo 2000 (Korean edition of Education at a Glance 2000) (Seoul: 
KEDI). 
 
Ohmae, K. (1993). “The Rise of Region State,” Foreign Affairs 72:2, 78-87. 
 
Pannu, R.S. (1996). “Neoliberal Project of Globalization: Prospects for Democratization of 
Education,” Alberta Journal of Educational Research 42:2, 87-101. 
 
Pokewitz, T.S. (2000). Educational Knowledge: Changing Relationships Between the State, Civil Society, and 
the Educational Community (Albany: State University of New York Press). 
 
Presidential Commission on Education Reform (PCER) (1995). Segehoa chongbohoa shidae-rul 
chudohanunn shingyoyugcheje surib-ul uihan kyoyuggaehyogbangan: che-2-cha taetongryong pogoso 
(Seoul: Taehangyogoaso). 
 
Ratinoff, L. (1995). “Global Insecurity and Education: The Culture of Globalization,” Prospects 
25:2, 147-74. 
 
Reynolds, C., and Griffiths, A. (2002). Equity and Globalization in Education (Calgary: Detselig). 
 
Samoff, J. (ed.) (1994). Coping with Crisis: Austerity, Adjustment and Human Resources (London: 
UNESCO with Cassell). 
 
Sasakibara, E. (1993). Beyond Capitalism: The Japanese Model of Market Economics (Lanham: University 
Press of America). 
 
Schoppa, L.J. (1991). Education Reform in Japan: A Case of Immobilist Politics (London: Routledge). 
 
Seth, M.J. (1997). “Strong State or Strong Society?: Educational Development in South Korea, 
1961-66,” Korean Studies 21, 72-95. 
 
Stromquist, N.P., and Monkman, K. (eds.) (2000), Globalization and Education: Integration and 
Contestation across Cultures (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). 
 
Torres, C.A. (2002). “Globalization, Education, and Citizenship: Solidarity Versus Markets?,” 
American Educational Research Journal 39:2, 363–378. 
 
UNESCO (1998) Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development 
(Paris: UNESCO). 
 
World Bank (1995), Priorities and Strategies for Education (Washington, D.C.: World Bank). 
 
 
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea                                                                                  24 
About the Author 
 
Ki Su Kim  
Faculty of Education, 
Memorial University 
St. John's, NL, Canada 
A1B 3X8 
Email: kskim@mun.ca 
Ki Su Kim is Professor of Philosophy of Education and Educational Policy at Memorial University, 
Canada. He is a graduate of Seoul National University, South Korea, and the University of Alberta, 
Canada. He has published ninety scholarly papers, three books, and several commissioned research 
reports, all on philosophical and policy issues in education. Recently, he has been exploring ways to 
make sense of educational policies within the established traditions of modern “political economy.” 
This article is a partial outcome of the ongoing exploration. 
 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 13 No. 12                                                                                25 
 
25 
Education Policy Analysis Archives                           http://epaa.asu.edu 
 
Editor: Sherman Dorn, University of South Florida 
Production Assistant: Chris Murrell, Arizona State University 
 
General questions about appropriateness of topics or particular articles may be 
addressed to the Editor, Sherman Dorn, epaa-editor@shermandorn.com.  
 
EPAA Editorial Board 
Michael W. Apple 
University of Wisconsin 
David C. Berliner  
Arizona State University 
Greg Camilli 
Rutgers University 
Linda Darling-Hammond  
Stanford University 
Mark E. Fetler 
California Commission on Teacher 
Credentialing 
Gustavo E. Fischman  
Arizona State Univeristy 
Richard Garlikov 
Birmingham, Alabama 
Gene V Glass 
Arizona State University 
Thomas F. Green 
Syracuse University 
Aimee Howley 
Ohio University 
Craig B. Howley 
Appalachia Educational Laboratory 
William Hunter 
University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology 
Patricia Fey Jarvis  
Seattle, Washington 
Daniel Kallós 
Umeå University 
Benjamin Levin 
University of Manitoba 
Thomas Mauhs-Pugh 
Green Mountain College 
Les McLean 
University of Toronto 
Heinrich Mintrop  
University of California, Berkeley 
Michele Moses  
Arizona State University 
Gary Orfield  
Harvard University 
Anthony G. Rud Jr. 
Purdue University 
Jay Paredes Scribner 
University of Missouri  
Michael Scriven 
Western Michigan University 
Lorrie A. Shepard 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Robert E. Stake  
University of Illinois—UC 
Kevin Welner 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Terrence G. Wiley 
Arizona State University 
John Willinsky 
University of British Columbia 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim: Unsuccessful Education Reform in South Korea                                                                                  26 
Archivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas 
 
Associate Editors 
Gustavo E. Fischman &  Pablo Gentili 
Arizona State University & Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
 
Founding Associate Editor for Spanish Language (1998—2003) 
Roberto Rodríguez Gómez 
 
Editorial Board 
 
Hugo Aboites  
Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana-Xochimilco 
Adrián Acosta  
Universidad de Guadalajara 
México 
Claudio Almonacid Avila 
Universidad Metropolitana de 
Ciencias de la Educación, Chile 
Dalila Andrade de Oliveira  
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brasil 
Alejandra Birgin  
Ministerio de Educación, 
Argentina 
Teresa Bracho 
Centro de Investigación y 
Docencia Económica-CIDE 
Alejandro Canales 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma 
de México 
Ursula Casanova 
Arizona State University, 
Tempe, Arizona 
Sigfredo Chiroque 
Instituto de Pedagogía Popular, 
Perú 
Erwin Epstein 
Loyola University, Chicago, 
Illinois 
Mariano Fernández 
Enguita Universidad de 
Salamanca. España 
Gaudêncio Frigotto  
Universidade Estadual do Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasil 
Rollin Kent  
Universidad Autónoma de 
Puebla. Puebla, México 
Walter Kohan 
Universidade Estadual do Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasil 
Roberto Leher   
Universidade Estadual do Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasil 
Daniel C. Levy 
University at Albany, SUNY, 
Albany, New York 
Nilma Limo Gomes  
Universidade Federal de 
Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte 
Pia Lindquist Wong 
California State University, 
Sacramento, California 
María Loreto Egaña  
Programa Interdisciplinario de 
Investigación en Educación 
Mariano Narodowski  
Universidad Torcuato Di 
Tella, Argentina 
Iolanda de Oliveira 
Universidade Federal 
Fluminense, Brasil 
Grover Pango 
 Foro Latinoamericano de 
Políticas Educativas, Perú 
Vanilda Paiva 
Universidade Estadual do Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasil 
Miguel Pereira  
Catedratico Universidad de 
Granada, España 
Angel Ignacio Pérez Gómez  
Universidad de Málaga 
Mónica Pini  
Universidad Nacional de San 
Martin, Argentina 
Romualdo Portella do 
Oliveira 
Universidade de São Paulo 
Diana Rhoten 
Social Science Research Council, 
New York, New York 
José Gimeno Sacristán 
 Universidad de Valencia, 
España 
Daniel Schugurensky  
Ontario Institute for Studies in 
Education, Canada  
Susan Street 
Centro de Investigaciones y 
Estudios Superiores en 
Antropologia Social Occidente, 
Guadalajara, México 
Nelly P. Stromquist 
University of Southern 
California, Los Angeles, 
California 
Daniel Suarez  
Laboratorio de Politicas 
Publicas-Universidad de Buenos 
Aires, Argentina 
Antonio Teodoro 
 Universidade Lusófona Lisboa,  
Carlos A. Torres  
UCLA 
Jurjo Torres Santomé 
Universidad de la Coruña, 
España 
 
